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ABSTRACT
By applying common financial risk assessment models to the network economy
formalized in Delli Gatti et al. (2006), and by contextualizing both in the broader
literature on complexity in economic systems, the question of convergence in economic
models is addressed. Critically, a formal state condition is identified which can contribute
to the emergence of periods of extreme divergence from expected conditions even in a
model characterized by restrictive assumptions regarding agent choice and market
structure. The strength of the impact of this state condition, here the topology of a credit
network, on the dynamics of the economic system is furthermore shown to be highly
dependent upon the structure of the market. The existence of such state conditions has
fundamental implications for the evaluation of risk and institutional design in economic
systems
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I Complexity
Reductive Theories and Complexity
In our attempts to understand the world we live in we are often forced to reduce
extreme complexity to a tractable form. This is the pursuit of the many theorists across all
disciplines who have built the great abstract constructions of science and philosophy: to
render a complex world understandable. In doing so it is unavoidable that we exchange
some degree of precision in subjective observation for the creation of abstract
frameworks. It must granted that such reduction is necessary, for without imposing order
on our observations we have no way of assessing the effect of any hypothetical action, or
attempting to predict future states upon which to base our decisions. Without a structured
understanding of reality we are left rudderless; we cannot choose. The critical question,
then, is to understand to what degree our impositions on reality blind us to the very
realities we are attempting to capture. When, in reducing observed phenomena to an
understandable form, do we fool ourselves into dismissing the possibility that our
framework may be wrong? Are we prepared to speak accurately to how severe the
deviation may be? How do we evaluate whether the framework serves as an aid to
decision making and not an obstruction? The possible questions about any such
framework are numerous, but resolve themselves into three general forms. The first is a
1

question of optimality: does the model approach reality as closely as possible given its
limitations? The second is one of complexity: how can we understand the possible
magnitude of the deviations from the predictions of the model, given that the true system
it attempts to summarize is in reality much more complex? One might be tempted to say
that this second question is really subsumed into the usual formulation of a confidence
interval. In reality, it is not. A confidence interval speaks to the level of error that is
possible given the stability of the system, we might say it is the inherent instability given
that the model obtains. Since the reality is much more complex, we must be concerned
about whether the dynamics possible in the higher order system are significant enough to
confound our lower order model, whether there is a more fundamental uncertainty in
parameter choice than can be captured in a model of lower-order complexity. Finally, as
our capabilities in modeling complexity have increased, we must ascertain whether or not
opportunities exist to lower the degree to which we have abstracted ourselves from reality
and in so doing begin to understand in some way the fundamental uncertainty that
plagues our models. While I do not propose to have complete answers to these questions,
in some sense their application to our understanding of financial risk is the aim of this
work. In order to do so it will be necessary to rest upon a particularly important
abstraction, one which attempts to categorize complexity.
In the introduction to Barriers and bounds to Rationality, Peter Albin presents just
such an abstraction. The system is designed to mirror Chomsky’s presentation of formal
language and presents a useful framework by which to understand the somewhat
nebulous term, “complex dynamics”, through the dynamics of the emergent behavior a
2

given system is capable of producing. In Albin’s framework, which for want of a better
term I will refer to as our “complexity scale”, the lowest category describes what we
might call trivial systems. Such systems lack dynamics entirely and can be defined as
equilibrium states, in such a framework prediction is meaningless since current
conditions will persist for all time. The second state, which might be named “Convergent
Dynamics”, define the family of systems producing dynamics which can be modeled
perfectly by well-behaved systems, their behavior exhibits no discontinuity and collapses
into a linear combination of the variables in parameter space. Within these models
prediction is possible indefinitely: the dynamics support only systems with constant or
absent variability. The third level is familiarly referred to as “Chaos”; systems exhibiting
third-order complexity produce dynamics that are imperfectly predictable over the short
term, and which can be understood as exhibiting the qualities of chaotic attractors. The
dynamics may be attracted to fixed points, but their rate of convergence might be
arbitrarily large or small given the position of the endowment point in parameter space.
Furthermore, within systems of third-order complexity, the relationships governing the
emergent dynamics of the system are variable over periods of time. The resulting shifting
patterns of attraction can lead to the appearance and disappearance of predictable system
behaviors, prediction is severely impeded in third-order systems, but possible within
certain bounds. Finally, fourth-order complex systems produce dynamics perhaps best
formalized as white noise with infinite variance. No objective model can be overlaid
upon observations to produce prediction; each observation exists in its own subjective
reality (Albin 1998).
3

It’s important to note that Albin does not assert that a system sufficiently complex
to produce fourth-order dynamics necessarily does so, merely that once a certain level of
complexity in the relationship between agents and their respective choice matrices is
achieved, such dynamics are possible. Whether or not dynamics of varying degrees
obtain at any given time is dependent on several state conditions, and these dependencies
may be more or less apparent in any given system. If these conditions vary over time, the
dynamics presented may bifurcate from one level of complex behavior to another. An
example: today we may all agree that the value of Apple stock is fairly well priced at
$636, which will cause us to interact in the market in a fairly benign way with minor
adjustments around that value-pricing due to our various beliefs about the long term
validity of that price. However, if some major event called that price into question, for
example if the patents that form the basis of Apple’s revolutionary tablet and smartphone
platforms were invalidated, a great many of us may begin to disagree fundamentally with
that price. Worse, we all may begin to disagree with one another over the new price as
well, greatly increasing volatility and reducing the convergence of the time-evolution of
price to any given function of known parameters. The value of the stock begins to behave
unpredictably.
In analyzing the exhibited dynamics of the above example we might note that the
state condition supporting convergence was the set of factors supporting the level of
certainty of the agents interacting in the market, when opinions became much less
certain, a model predicting the price of the stock would have “diverged” with very wide
implied variance. State conditions are then the conditions which support the foundational
4

relationships required for a given model to obtain, the environmental factors which
support dynamics pointing to a given assumption. In the context of the financial crisis, for
example, the growth of fraud, affirmation bias, leverage, and the mispricing of risk served
as evidences of the collapse of the state conditions supporting the orderly valuation of
mortgages. The collapse of these conditions themselves did not immediately lead to the
severe uncertainty and chaotic price movements characteristic of the worst days of the
crisis, instead, it rendered such a scenario possible. One could assert that the bifurcation
from orderly market interactions to disorderly ones was made possible via these changes.
Any given model is characterized by a set of such conditions, and failures to understand
how those conditions might change over time constitute an assumption that a given
model, which is by definition reductive, expresses a perfect reflection of reality.
The vast majority of economic models are predicated upon a theoretical
framework constructed within a system capable only of producing at most second-order
complexity. These are the familiar equilibrium models introduced in freshman economics
courses, in which systems of supply and demand schedules interact such that any point in
endowment space collapses quickly to equilibrium (the framework in general lacks even
the dynamics to describe this collapse, it is assumed to take place in an arbitrarily small
period of time in relation to the period of concern of the model). The ultimate expansion
of these models merely extends the concept into arbitrary numbers of interacting markets.
Event those economic systems concerned with dynamics are in general fairly limited in
their use of the available family of dynamics systems. Neoclassical models of capital
formulation generate either linear growth, or variations of cyclical behavior. Even the
5

most extreme examples deal with the interaction of multiple equillibria; and the dynamics
of movement between these equilibria is often quite thoroughly underdefined. In fact, in
applying fairly simple stochastic elements derived from the field of thermodynamics to
explain the dynamics of agent interaction in the familiar 2x2x2 Edgeworth box model,
Duncan Foley effectively destroys a common neoclassical conclusion: that agents
beginning with the same endowments arrive at the same final allocations (Smith and
Foley 2008). Such a result is the consequence of applying a model which exists in static
time to a world which exists in complex space.
In every case, as soon as inter-temporal considerations are allowed, second order
systems begin to impose strange restrictions on the behavior they model. We are often
forced to imagine the ability of economic agents to solve optimization in infinite time (as
in game theory) or to assume that the full trajectory of future allocations of consumption
and capital can be correctly assessed by agents (as in General Equilibrium with
investment). Such paradoxes have been touted as evidences of the strength of the
deductive reasoning behind them: “economist Robert Lucas has boasted that the axioms
underlying classical economics are ‘artificial, abstract, patently unreal’. […]Lucas insists
that such unreal assumptions are ‘the only scientific method of doing economics’”
(Davidson 2009, p.5). In actuality, for a discipline occasionally accused of suffering due
to its love affair with science, in terms of complexity, economics has been left behind by
the physical sciences. While I am not personally familiar with much in the way of
theoretical physics, the postulation of steady state systems appears positively Newtonian.
As was mentioned before, the application of statistical dynamics can invalidate
6

neoclassical conclusions, and there likely exists a wealth of additional value to be gained
from the further study of complexity in economics. Similarly, meteorology has advanced
beyond economics by leaps and bounds (with great results too, once our partners in
fruitless prognostication, meteorologists are now able to predict the occurrence of
tornadoes by several minutes in most cases, a critical improvement. We economists find it
difficult even to agree that certain economic phenomena have obtained in the past, let
alone that they will obtain in the future).
We are forced to conclude that a vast sample of economic models by their nature
ignore, or treat in only the most perfunctory or arcane manner, the question of agent
behavior in a world with a time dimension. In the realm of risk management this is highly
problematic, as all risk is by nature inter-temporal, and worse, intertemporally uncertain.
To the extent that economic systems do in fact exhibit third-order and fourth-order
complexity, the possibility exists that we are severely mispricing risk. Such an assertion
would seem to be fairly obvious in the context of the financial turmoil of the past few
years. However, it might be fair to wonder what statistical artifacts would enable us to
assess whether recent mispricings may have been due to the inherent complexity of
financial systems (in effect whether pricing predictions were too tight and implied more
foresight than may have been possible), or whether the mispricing was due to market
failures that drove market pricings away from long run equilibrium (in effect, that there
was no problem with the implied precision of the estimate, but rather only that significant
biases existed). The answer lies in the fundamental assertion of financial economics of
the validity of mean field approximation.
7

Challenges for Classical Convergence
As has been previously alluded, the degree of precision in prediction falls
precipitously as the degree of complexity of a given system increases. Unfortunately, this
lack of precision has been criticized as a weakness of complex models when assessed
against the cohesive structure which serves as the foundation of mainstream economics.
As a consequence the models of the mainstream often fail to implement the lessons of
complexity, and practitioners are repeatedly surprised when the “impossible” obtains,
when in actuality they should expect a landscape in which the state conditions supporting
their models are prone to bifurcation. In finance, the efficient market hypothesis
postulates a marketplace in which deviations from “true” pricing, or that implied by the
correct assessment of the probability of future returns, are allowed only to obtain in the
short run (see the definition of EMH given by Malkiel 1992). Long run pricing
assumptions common to such equilibrium models have served to reinforce the sorts of
affirmation bias that have crippled the ability of the financial system and regulatory
agencies to correctly asses the likelihood and impact of systemic failure. Such paradigms
do not allow for the existence of the bifurcations possible in the real world.
This mainstream framework of fundamental coherence has been challenged by
significant bodies of economic inquiry. Notably, Kahneman and Traversky have
submitted a theory of decision making which poses very difficult questions for the
rational agent hypothesis, leading to the emergence of studies into Behavioral Economics,
in which agents cannot be expected to exhibit classically rational behavior (Kahneman
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2011). But, we need not even go as far as the behavioral economists have in order to find
crippling breakdowns of the system’s conclusions; without even relaxing the assumption
that agents behave rationally, it can be shown that the conclusions of the neoclassical
system fail to obtain when agents are faced with a limited subset of the available
knowledge (Greenwald and Stiglitz 1988).
Such assertions, that economic actors are not omniscient, or that economic agents
fail to exhibit perfectly rational behavior, are in most cases granted. In fact, most
economists would likely agree that the behavioralists have discovered interesting artifacts
of human behavior. What is contended, however, is that while such disturbances can
cause short term instabilities, the long run systemic dynamics can be defined within the
bounds of the rational model, that instabilities are cancelled in the mean. This is of course
a direct rejection of third and fourth-order complexity, under which such mean field
approximations can fail as useful descriptions of systemic behaviors since state
conditions are subject to change. Such losses of convergence, and to a resulting extent
therefore a loss of numerical precision in the definition of the dynamics, are artifacts of
real world market behavior. The qualitative story told becomes deeply cautionary: the
value of precise modeling is bounded by the fluctuating state of the system.
Interestingly, while increases in the power of modern computing and the
sophistication of statistical methods have made it possible to estimate the predictions of
increasingly complex models, the result seems to have been ever stronger assertions of
certainty and coherence rather than a understanding of the implications of divergence in
higher-order complex systems. Commentary during the years leading up to the most
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recent financial crises has been characterized by a common theme. “Innovations” in the
financial services sector have purported to leverage these advances to increase the
efficiency of economic allocation (Ang and Cheng 2005, Wiel and Yves 2010). In
particular, the refrain has been that the increased pace of innovation in the financial
markets has likewise increased the efficiency of the allocation of financial risk, those
actors most willing (and possibly most able, depending on the model examined) to
assume the risk do so and are accurately compensated for it (These largely flow from
Arrow 1964). In the aggregate the risk is “shared” with complex interconnections
between financial agents ensuring that the effects of risks when realized are diversified
and that their impact is dispersed in such a way that the ability of the financial sector to
facilitate real production is not unduly impacted.

Approach
It is unfortunate that this ideal diversification has not obtained in actual markets.
Purely or primarily financial crises have caused massive damage to economic systems,
arising in markets characterized by differing degrees of regulation and government
intervention. The narratives proposed as backdrops to each of these financial crises have
certainly varied, and it is not the aim of this work to support or refute any particular
narrative of any particular crisis. Instead, by studying the nature of financial prediction
(and by extension, the entirety of the general equilibrium framework under ArrowDebreu) in light of the rich complexities possible in agent based models, it is hoped that
something constructive can be expressed in the direction of answering an ontological
10

question: What are our abilities in the face of a financial system that is characterized by a
highly variable structure?
Agent Based Modeling (ABM) is a simulation approach which models microlevel behavior (agent level) to produce systemic results. Similar to the neoclassical micro
foundations of macro behavior, in ABM agents are granted endowments in the form of
initial conditions, and rules defining their reactions to external stimuli (the role played by
profit and utility-maximization in the neoclassical framework). However, the similarities
end there. The neoclassical approach goes on to formulate assumptions about agent
choice in a very specific way, with continuously defined and differentiable utility and
production functions, with the express aim of arriving at an analytical solution to the
problem of agents’ choices in a system with many agents. Indeed, the Arrow-Debreu
framework was in a sense constructed to solve exactly that problem and arrive at the
General Equilibrium condition as an analytical solution to economic systems. Of course,
complex systems often have no such convenient analytical solutions. In agent based
modeling agent choice is not so constrained, the decision rules granted agents can allow
for discontinuity and context sensitivity, allowing for the creation of systems of the
highest levels of complexity. Agents arrive at choices in an algorithmic way, indeed,
analytical solutions may not obtain. The interaction of these agents when placed in an
economic context proceeds via a market or a set of conditions contextualizing their
choices, and the resulting emergent behavior makes up the macroeconomic results of
differing micro-economic decision matrices. Importantly, causation can go both ways,
from agents onto macroeconomic effects, and from institutional structure onto agents.
11

The definition of agent choice must proceed with caution, however, due to the possibility
of arriving at fourth order dynamics (infinite variance). It is therefore perhaps most useful
to employ agent based modeling towards a better understanding of the conditions that
drive bifurcation and uncertainty in economic systems. The extent to which such
conditions exist may define the limits of economic forecasting. In this work ABM is
employed in informing the extent of our ignorance, rather than purporting to improve our
ability to precisely forecast future events.
Several agent based models have been proposed to explore the possible
determinants of real world behavior; in particular the literature has focused on the
restriction of agent’s ability to garner complete information about their world, building
perhaps on the introduction of heterogeneous reactions on the part of agents to observed
phenomena. The problem of choice, then, becomes the complex attempt on the part of the
agent to assess the best reaction to real world phenomena, given what they observe.
Results garnered are centered on the problem of framing behavioral choices to lead to
optimal outcomes (from the realm of behavioral economics), or upon the best policy
anticipation for the results of uninformed choices (Alan 2011, Chakrabati et al. 2011).
Another body of inquiry, and that studied in the few models touched upon below, centers
around the effects of the structure of an economy upon the outcomes of the actions of
agents with tightly defined choice sets. In a given “network” economy, the choices
available to the agent are defined by the topology of the network. An agent may only be
able to enter into a credit or purchase relationship with a defined set of partners within the
model or it may have a set of choices regarding which partners it wishes to do business
12

with. Agent relationships, behavior, and economic outcomes, are consequently dependent
on network which is in turn defined by behavior. The resulting feedback loops prove to
lead to the sorts of chaotic returns and divergent expectations common in the real world,
and certainly provides an avenue for exploring the complexity of the time path of such
second order metrics as covariance/correlation.
Most importantly, when leveraging such agent based models, it becomes possible
to speak in a very concrete way about the structural foundations of the emergent behavior
of the system. The main thrust of this work will center on a well-known agent based
model, presented in Delli Gatti et al. (2006), which constructs a framework for assessing
the effects of credit topologies (the weights and layout of the various credit arrangements
in the productive process) on firm profits and bankruptcy cascades. By leveraging an
existing risk evaluation technique, a diversification coefficient based upon value-at-risk
and defined in Perignon and Smith (2010), the model can be shown to create dynamics
which “break” the foundational assumptions of a variety of risk-management techniques.
Furthermore, it will be shown that the severity of this violation is dependent in a
fundamental way on the degree of concentration of credit connections. This narrow
assertion (focusing on the limitations of certain families of risk management techniques)
sits solidly in the context of a broader ongoing argument over the fundamental limits of
prediction in economic systems, as such, it will be beneficial to contextualize the work
via a discussion of the question of quantifiable vs. fundamental uncertainty as it obtains
in the frameworks posited by Keynes (writing on fundamental uncertainty) and Arrow
and Debreu (assuming quantifiable uncertainty). Once placed in this broader context, a
13

description of the model and techniques used in the work will be followed by an
exploration of the mechanisms that drive the complex results discovered. Finally, a
presentation of the results obtained will illustrate clearly the conclusions of the work,
namely that the simple model produced in Delli Gatti et al. (2006), and to some extent the
2010 reformulation, produces a bifurcating realization of variable state-conditions (in this
case the structure of the correlation between bank profits). In short the fundamental
question of prediction ceases to be framed in the context of correctly calibrating signal
weights, and must be predicated upon the realization that real-world economies are
shaped by a system capable of producing the highest of complexities, in which not all
state-conditions lead to predictive models that converge.
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II. Lit Review
Keynes, Minsky, Albin, and Fundamental Uncertainty
In a 2009 article Paul Davidson asserts that there exist two distinct modeling
approaches which attempt to define the nature of the operation of a capital economy. He
names these two approaches “Classical Economy Theory”, and the “Keynesian Theory of
Liquidity in an Entrepreneurial Economy” (Davidson 2009). As Davidson explains, the
primary difference between the two theoretical frameworks lies in their treatment of
economic agents’ decision making in the context of unknown future events. In the
Classical theory, agents’ current period decisions are contingent upon their understanding
of the likelihood of future events, which is in turn defined by their assessment of the
statistical occurrence of like events in the past. In all cases, for the operating of the
general equilibrium assumptions underpinning classical ideas of equilibrium (and thus the
entire basis for the theoretical conclusion of efficiency), this understanding of the
likelihood of future events must be complete, in that to every future possibility a
probability must be defined. Davidson goes on to explain that not only must these
probability distributions be defined, but that additionally “these subjective distributions
must be equal to the objective probability distributions that will govern outcomes at any
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particular future date” (Davidson 2009), a requirement known as the ergodic axiom (more
on this later).
By contrast, Keynes asserts in the General Theory that when making investment
decisions in the current period, agents are faced with a set of future conditions that while
conditional on current actions, are fundamentally uncertain. Thus, when attempting to
make these decisions, agents must rely on their “subjective degree of belief regarding
future events” (Davidson 2009) (in effect the assertion is that agents can be wrong). It is
interesting to note as well that Keynes’ understanding of economic agents as
fundamentally uncertain, as opposed to fundamentally certain, lends support to and quite
obviously predates the observations of “herd” behavior and other exhibitions of human
response to extreme uncertainty commented upon by the behavioralists (Davidson 2010).
In such a context equilibrium conditions cannot be expected to obtain, and the
conclusions of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (as derived from the equilibrium results
of Arrow 1964) are called into serious question. If agents cannot be relied upon to make
decisions to invest based upon the optimal coordination of all future states, and if that
failure is not due to the usual descriptions of market failure, whether they obtain in the
form of “government shocks” forcing the system from a long run equilibrium, or from
sub-optimal equilibria due to incentive structures such as “excessive discounting” or any
other relaxation of the strict neoclassical theory, but rather is due to failure of equilibrium
conditions to obtain even in a free market, then the conclusions of the neoclassical
synthesis are severely challenged.

16

From an empirical standpoint, the ergodic axiom does not have a good track
record. Most immediate to the mind of the reader, perhaps, is the utter economic chaos
resulting from house price projections which ignored the stability of the assumptions
necessary to sustain growing prices. It’s not even as though the necessary assumptions
were few; in order to support the value proposition of the credits backed by the houses,
sufficient (or in this case infinite) market depth and perfect information were among the
conditions required to obtain. Of course, this severe empirical refutation of the Efficient
Market Hypothesis has largely failed to lead to a rejection of the theory. It is still taught,
and the neoclassical models are still the basis of a majority of economic thought. In
general, such major empirical evidences of a non-ergodic world lead to qualifications of
the EMH; economists create multiple equilibrium models in which various factors
conspire to cause long run deviations from equilibrium. If the “failures” behind these
deviations could be corrected, it is argued, the unfettered economy would gravitate
toward efficiency (Stiglitz 1989). What is desperately needed is a discussion of whether
the ergodic axiom can itself obtain in any conditions.
It shouldn’t be assumed that a rejection of neoclassical modeling techniques leads
necessarily to the transformation of economics from a “scientific” and quantitative
pursuit to a qualitative one (although really, what use is an incorrect quantitative
“science” to anyone?). With advances in the realm of complexity theory and increased
understanding of human decision making, which is the real contribution of the
behavioralists, it is becoming increasingly possible to speak to uncertainty in a technical
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sense. Or rather, it has been possible to do so for a while, but the ground is ripe for
further advance.
In the realm of investment – to narrow our scope a bit – the application of
Keynes’ theory of liquidity paints a fundamentally different picture than that of the
classical theories. In that pursuit, Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis builds
upon Chp. 12 of the General Theory to produce a comprehensive discussion of the
progression of financial markets from stability to fragility. In financial markets, Minsky
asserts that realized profits in one period provide the rationalization for increased
leverage in the next. Creditors are willing to extend credit based on past profits, but the
injection of fresh capital in the form of these credits enables the sector to further increase
profits, and new investment floods the profitable sector. Over time the dynamic is
unsustainable. As new sources of financing are exhausted, prices cannot continue their
previous meteoric rises. This has two immediate effects, first, the flow of credit is further
restricted as profits fall, second, if the cycle has progressed far enough, firms will have
become dependent on the flow of new financing to facilitate the servicing of past period
debts. Minsky calls this state “Speculative Finance” or “Ponzi Finance” depending on the
severity of the phenomenon (Minsky 2008). We might imagine the degree of leverage in
the sector as a state condition determining the possible degree of correction which would
result from a restriction of new finance. Early in the cycle the correction might be small,
as firms are able to finance based on carried profits. As the degree of leverage in the
system increases, the size of possible corrections increases, thus decreasing the degree of
convergence for any predictive model which correctly assesses the loss of new financing
18

as a real possibility; the range of possible next period outcomes grows. It might be
possible to extend this line of reasoning to assert that under sufficiently extreme
conditions, prediction becomes computationally impossible, as the severity of the chaos
of a possible market meltdown grows.
In Barriers and Bounds to Rationality, Peter Albin raises just such a question in
the context of computational systems. Albin suggests the modeling of economic
dynamics at the level of interacting agents (which he names, somewhat cumbersomely,
“Cellular Automata”). As we have seen, leveraging the ideas of Gödel, Albin asserts that
under certain conditions it can be shown that systems of interacting agents can produce
dynamics for which any fully specified predictive model would be “unknowable”, in that
in a computational sense no agent could ascertain how long a set of methods built to
assess the models future time path would take to converge. Indeed, the agent would be
unable to know whether the methods would converge to a conclusion in any finite period
of time. The assertion is supported by a proof which rests on the work of Kurt Gödel, an
Austrian/American mathematician made famous by his development of incompleteness
theorems obtaining within Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, a supposedly
complete formalization of all mathematical truth from basic axioms. In showing that
paradoxes (the reason for the name incompleteness: completeness implies all statements
can be proved either true or false; it is a lack of undecidability) existed within Whitehead
and Russell’s work, Gödel essentially proved paradox fundamental to mathematical logic.
In order to do so, Gödel relied on a clever formalization of self-reference to create the
statement “this statement is false” in formal logic. (For a complete discussion of Godel
19

incompleteness including its connections to economic prediction and a proof of the
inconstructibility of a predictor in systems with self-reference see Barriers and Bounds to
Rationality Chapter 2).
For Albin, the existence of formal undecidability is supported in economic
models of Cellular Automata through the formalization of increasingly complex decision
rules for automata. If an agent in endowed with the ability to formulate its own decision
on that of its neighbor, and its neighbor likewise chooses at least partially based on the
original agent’s own observed choice, it can clearly be seen that both agents’ choice
matrices are to some extent self-referential (Albin 1998). Simple formulations of game
theory often solve the problem of circular reference in formal games through the
conceptualization of infinite time horizons, but such solutions are difficult to believe (an
agent solves an infinite set?) and have been shown problematic in real world experiments
(Eichberger and Kelsey 2011). Albin shows that fairly simple choice sets can lead to
completely unpredictable emergent behavior at the aggregate level, and suggests that the
existence of such dynamics in simple models should all but prove its existence in real
markets, where agents are allowed much more complex and variable choice sets. In the
context of broader economic thought, dynamics matter. It’s entirely possible that
equilibrium may fail to obtain, and even that any static picture could completely fail to
characterize the system.

20

Arrow-Debreau, Copula Pricing, and Value at Risk
Traditionally, the treatment of the quantification of uncertainty (and I use the
word purposefully, the majority of efforts to quantify prediction have ignored the
possibility of fundamental uncertainty) has progressed according to two interconnected
paradigms. The first involves the evaluation of statistical models upon historical data,
complicated trend parameterizations such as GARCH/ARCH and ARIMA fall into this
category. Such models necessarily require that at least on some level current conditions
obtain over the time horizon of the forecast (ie. second or third-order complexity, for a
survey of time-series forecasting methods applied to financial markets, see Taylor 2008).
Should whatever statistical artifacts a given model is built upon be violated during the
period forecast, the forecast will, for obvious reasons, be rendered incorrect. In the
context of this first paradigm, prediction is facilitated by the correct estimation of the
patterns underlying economic data, possible failures explored by the practitioner might
include model misspecifications around the memory of the system, the periodicity of
cyclical behavior, or bias in estimator values. The second paradigm has to do with the
choice of specific statistical artifact and implies the application of a structural framework
to empirical data in the form of an economic model. In the context of the earlier noted
ergodic paradigm, equilibrium models require that when the correct economic
frameworks are applied to statistical estimations of past conditions, the resulting
conclusions must obtain over every future period (Davidson 2009) so that agents are able
to correctly decide upon current period behavior such that all possible future utility is
maximized.
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The work of Arrow and Debreu codified the idea of general equilibrium into a
comprehensive mathematical model. By assuming economic agents to possess preference
sets that were both complete (all possible bundles of goods are associated with
preferences), and convex (implying a decreasing marginal rate of substitution) the ArrowDebreu model proves the existence of a unique equilibrium point at which preferences
are optimally balanced with constraints. The restricted model is then expanded to show
the existence of general equilibrium under an expanded set of conditions for the economy
as a whole (Varian 1992).
Such a concentration on equilibrium has led to a massive foundation of
mainstream thought on the concept of comparative statics. The earliest foundations of
economic teaching are in general pictures of supply and demand graphs depicting nicely
drawn smooth curves intersecting at ubiquitous black dots. Students are then taught the
factors which move the supply and demand curves, and are told to reproduce the
movements and descriptions of the format “quantity increases and price increases when
demand increases” on tests and draw nice arrows describing the movements. In more
complicated frameworks many economic models still often rest upon these
parameterizations of equilibrium conditions. The quantification of the effects of a given
policy on the welfare of the poor takes current conditions as current equilibrium, and
assesses the effects on the various determinants of the welfare function and assess the
cost to one group, benefit to another, and pronounce the new intersection (in this case a
hyperplane separating convex sets) the result of the proposed policy. At this point it
should be noted that a “dynamic” neoclassical model expressing convergence to a
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constant rate of change, for example in capital accumulation (even those with multiple
equilibria, see Böhm and Vachadze 2007), is qualitatively no different from a static
equilibrium, the constant state merely exists in the derivative; this is not accounting for
“dynamics” as such, and does not constitute an understanding of how equilibrium is met,
it is simply integrated comparative statics. If equilibria fail to obtain as often as not, it is
very problematic for such predictive modeling.
The vast majority of financial pricing models rely directly on the existence of
Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. Indeed the A-D framework itself attempts to solve the
problem of the intertemporal allocation of capital; in order to arrive at a general
equilibrium the framework arrives at a specification of allocations which solve the system
of equations for resource allocation across time (Davidson 2009). The application of this
equilibrium model to financial markets is then a logical extension, which Arrow takes up
in his 1964 article The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing. An
examination of Arrow’s discovery of an optimal risk allocation across all future states is
contingent upon the assessment in the current period of the likelihood that any given
future state should occur, otherwise his utility function: 𝑉𝑖 = ∑𝑠𝑖=1 𝜋𝑠 𝑈𝑖 describing the
expected utility conditional on the likelihood that state s occurs in some future period,
wouldn’t exist since πs would not exist (Arrow 1964, p94). If it is further the case that the
optimal distribution in some future state, s, is itself contingent on the conditional
probability of state t obtaining at some point after s, we can support Davidson’s claim that
Arrow-Debreu requires the assessment of the optimal distribution of goods be conditional
upon not only the likelihood of any future state, (the s in Arrow’s utility), obtaining in an
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immediate future, but also upon the distributions of all possible future states across all
time. This makes a certain kind of sense if we realize that current investment decisions
are predicated upon opinions of the future, and that future investment decisions will
likely continue to be defined by similar considerations. What is odd is the assertion that
agents can account for this infinite set of possibilities in infinite time. While Arrow’s
approach to the solution for optimal risk-sharing is mathematically coherent, it would
appear to pose critical problems of computability. How is it possible for an economic
agent to ascertain the likelihood of any given state with perfect accuracy, let alone the
likelihood of any state at any arbitrary point in the future? Critically, the conclusion that
market pricings are generally correct in an equilibrium sense is necessary for the current
body of theory supporting models of financial risk. From Aroujo et al. (2010):
“Since the Arrow’s Role of Securities seminal paper, the financial general
equilibrium models assume that the price of assets satisfies equilibrium conditions
in a competitive setting where many agents demand assets profiles in accordance
with their preferences and their endowments, providing the foundations for the
study of financial markets by a celebrated fundamental result asserting that
financial markets must not offer arbitrage opportunities” (Aroujo et al. 2010, p.2).
In particular, the pricing of complex derivative products has often required the utilization
of such assumptions, since if financial general equilibrium fails to obtain, we have
fundamental mispricicing in the market. The evaluation of the risk profiles of complex
derivative instruments relies heavily on the assumption of perfect market pricing. In Li
(2000), three separate approaches are described to estimate the present value of such a
portfolio of credits (specifically he is referring to the now infamous mortgage backed
securities and other CDOs). The first is the estimation of asset and default correlation
based on a body of historical knowledge which we might name the statistical/historical
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approach, the second uses the Merton option-theoretical approach, and the third operates
via asset swap spreads (Li 2000). The second and third approaches are expressions of the
Arrow-Debreu framework applied to financial markets (and the first is a tautological
representation of the ergodic axiom). In all cases, convergence conditions can only be
met via the assumption of equilibrium pricing under perfect competition. The swap
spread approach infers default probabilities through the spread between treasuries (or
securities for which the default probability is zero) and the credits in question. Such
“pricing” requires an accurate assessment by the market of the default probability of the
credits, and such a correct assessment could only be fully supported by a perfect market.
Given the degree of fraud prevalent in the mortgage market at the time these pricing
models found widespread use, such a claim is farcical (A quick look at bank litigation
losses since the crisis would give a rough valuation).
All of the above approaches utilize a copula function to generate a multivariate
probability distribution for the assessment of future price at the derivative level. In
multivariate statistics, a copula function is any function of the form 𝐶 = Φ(𝜙 −1 (𝐴𝑖 )∀𝑖 ∈
Ζ, Σ) which generates a multivariate distribution function from a set of observed marginal
distributions. In the case of the CDO, the marginal distributions are the observed survival
times of the assets that make up the instrument. Once the multivariate distribution is
evaluated, expectations of future price, and more importantly expressions of aggregate
risk at the portfolio level can be quantified. The correlation matrix Σ is given through
analysis of survival time or asset value correlation and can have a critical effect on the
evaluated copula (Li 2000). Thus these copula pricing models required accurate
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calibration of the correlation matrix, Li’s three methods attempt to do just that via either
straight expressions of historical correlations or inferred relationships between
constituent credits as expressed by market pricing. In the context of fundamental
uncertainty, this calibration presents great difficulty. Both observed historical correlations
and market assessments of risk are subject to state conditions that are prone to variability
over time. At best, predictions might be expected to obtain over short time horizons
(under third-order dynamics). Once again, CDO structures don’t lend themselves to an
optimistic assessment in this regard; their underlying credits were in many cases 30 year
mortgages.
A second family of better known risk evaluation models, known under the
common name Value-at-Risk (VaR), rest upon the assessment of the downside tail of
returns. In general trading firms and major financial institutions will forecast the expected
1% or 5% one day ahead upper bound for losses across their portfolios. This Value-atRisk effectively quantifies the short term risks facing the firm and is used in the
specification of various aspects of firms’ required capital cushions. It should be noted that
the technical inference of VaR is often implicitly mischaracterized as the maximum value
a firm can expect to lose with a 95 or 99% confidence interval. In reality, the previous
statement severely understates the implied possible risk facing the firm, a correctly
calibrated one-day-ahead 1% Value-at-Risk should be expected to generate VaR “Breaks”
(days on which losses at least exceed the VaR) between three to four times a year. So, a
correct statement of the interpretation of VaR would be that the firm should expect to lose
at least the VaR three to four times a year. Additionally, in the context of such
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leptokurtosis in returns as obtains in the stock market, the actual loss during a VaR break
could be orders of magnitude larger than the VaR itself (one only needs to visit the list of
trading losses on Wikipedia to understand how true this statement is). A multitude of
methods have been proposed to calculate value at risk, both in the context of normal
(Linsmeier and Pearson 2000) or non-normal returns, and in dealing with complex
correlation structures within a portfolio. The technical construction can be built off of
historical values or Monte Carlo simulations given current distribution structures
(Linsmeier and Pearson 2000). Value-at-Risk models have even been proposed building
upon copula-based multivariate distributions (Miller and Liu 2006), and Monte Carlo
simulations built off of ARCH/GARCH models (Mancini and Trojani 2011) to
parameterize possible conditional variance among the credits of a portfolio. Whatever the
technical aspects of their construction, at their core VaRs are simply the value of the
cumulative distribution function at either 5 or 1%, or by extension the area in the 1% or
5% tail of the distribution of loss.
Perignon and Smith (2010) provides a convenient method by which to assess the
degree of covariance within a portfolio via Value-at-Risk by assessing the percent
deviation between the observed VaR of the portfolio and the VaR of a theoretical
portfolio with identical dollar weights but perfect correlation across assets. Leveraging
this “diversification coefficient” will allow us to assess the time evolution of such
correlations, and in so doing begin to study the possible uncertainty inherent in the state
conditions necessary to support the large family of derivative Copula pricing models:
extreme variance and kurtosis in the time-evolution of diversification would seriously
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cripple the degree of convergence. The ultimate goal is much deeper than merely
specifying an expectation of variation in parameter values, through the application of an
Agent Based Model in concert with Albin’s discussions of unpredictability a conclusion
of periodic fundamental uncertainty in these risk-pricing models is strongly supported.

Agent Based Modeling (ABM)
While there exists a sizable body of literature, the use of non-linear dynamics in
economic models is a developing work. In many important areas they remain on the
periphery, secondary in importance to the more common applications of comparative
statics (Zhang 2005). Less work has been done, however, in the examination of agent
based models, which enable the simulation of the highest levels of complexity. Even
more than non-linear dynamics, agent based modeling allows for the study of the
functional determinants of convergence and divergence in dynamics. Depressingly, the
application of Monte Carlo simulations to the estimation of portfolio risk is likely the
most widely applied instance of simulation today. It is important to note that there exists
significant difference between the simulation of a statistical expression of emergent
behavior (Monte Carlo simulations of correlated returns for example) and the simulation
of the dynamics which produce these emergent behaviors. Indeed, the very advantage of
ABM is that it allows us to specify choice matrices for economic agents that do not
necessarily lead to convergent models, but which instead allow us to study possible
determinants of the conditions which are necessary for modeling convergence. As was
touched upon above, if we cannot support the stability of these conditions, it is possible
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that the emergent behavior of the system could be computationally “unknowable” and
prediction models would diverge. The realization that such states could exist is critical,
especially if the conditions driving convergence/divergence can be better understood.
There is certainly a growing body of literature on ABM (agent based models), and
network models in particular, however, the critical question of convergence vs.
divergence has not generally been addressed.
In Delli Gatti et al. (2006 and later expanded in Delli Gatti et al. 2010), the
authors present an economy characterized by three types of agents, downstream firms,
upstream firms, and banks. The three groups interact through a series of credit
relationships, both to finance the purchase of intermediate goods, and to fund their wagebills. The firm network acts as a semi-closed system: all production is consumed,
providing the energy input to the system, while bankruptcies and the wage bill extract
wealth from the system. Within the model a number of factors lead to outcomes that
mimic observed reality in important ways. Due to the nature of the connections between
firms and banks, the normally distributed stochastic energy input (the revenue of
downstream firms) results in several non-normal outcomes. Sufficient loss in a single
downstream firm can spread as a cascading bankruptcy through the rest of the network,
the extent of which is only constrained by the margins on which agents are operating and
the depth of the connections in the network. Furthermore, the interest rate mechanism is
biased towards larger firms, as growing net worth implies stability to banks, supporting
lower borrowing costs. The results highlighted are kurtosis in the aggregate value of bad
debt due to cascading failure, and fat tails in firm size distribution. These results arise not
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solely due to the interest rate mechanism but also due credit constraints which allow
growing nodes to continue to grow but in the case of loss constrain others, reinforcing the
growth tendency through a variety of factors (Delli Gatti et al. 2006).
Since the publication in 2006 of the initial model, the group has updated the
model to be more refined. By introducing an endogenous choice to the formation and
dissolution of credit connections, the updated model has adopted a possible explanation
of the method by which the network can evolve. The change has two advantages. First,
endogenous agent choice allows for a closer approximation of reality. Firms are not
completely restricted in their choice of credit and real connections (although, as Stiglitz
himself has pointed out, choice can be severely constrained in credit possibilities for
small and medium enterprises. Often, a single bank advances credit in the light of a long
term relationship with the borrower, finding a replacement can often be difficult for the
SME, see Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003). Instead they have choice in respect to with
whom they chose to do business. Second, the observation is made that the results of the
initial model are reinforced through the introduction of an endogenous and variable
network topology. Since incentives exist to encourage firms seeking new credit partners
and thereby to gravitate towards established network nodes (again, size implies stability),
leptokurtosis in firm size distribution is reinforced, and the excess kurtosis in the time
evolution of bad debt is similarly strengthened (Delli Gatti et al. 2010).
The results of the model were already well established at the time of its
publication; Axtell (2001) finds robust results detailing a zipf distribution of firms, and
kurtosis in returns to investment are highlighted in a massive number of studies on
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various stock markets (Mandlebrot 1963, presenting perhaps an iconic example) and is a
well-recognized result. However, there is an additional result which was not highlighted
in the 2006 or the 2010 formulation of the credit-network economy, but which is
supported by work in Mizgier, Wagner, and Holyst (2012) and Battison et al. (2007),
which is that the concentration of a network economy has drastic implications on the
generation of global and local risk. Wagner et al. (2009), studied supplier default
dependencies via a copula approach, and this work will leverage the Delli Gatti et al.
model to connect the body of supplier default correlation/cascade models and literature
on portfolio pricing in an attempt to understand the implications of fundamental
uncertainty on risk assessment. The results are similar, the default correlation structure of
the financial markets are dependent upon network topologies. In contrast to their work,
the focus of this piece is to highlight the factors complicating the prediction of future
value based on current state conditions and thus the assumption of convergence to
equilibrium. The ability of such network models to produce dynamics which either
experience sustained and volatile deviations from equilibrium conditions, or to fail to
approximate any recognizable notion of equilibrium, introduce in a very real way the
possibility of divergence in expectations of price.
In E. Nier et al. (2006), the network economy is formalized as an Erdös-Rení
random graph, wherein the nodes of the network economy are connected and summarized
given a few broad statements about the distribution of credit connections. The model is
defined by a number of nodes, 𝑁, a probability expression 𝑝𝑖𝑗 defining the likelihood that
any given bank has lent to another bank in the system, the average mix of eternal to
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internal assets (within the system, the proportion of interbank to external lending), a
parameter defining the net worth as a function of total assets, and a residual deposit
variable (E. Nier et al. 2006). In generating the simulations, the authors choose to shock
single banks and study the propagation of default chains through the system. Their
isolated formal approach has the advantage of studying the propagation of default risk in
networks absent the muddying influence of the dynamic systems studied in this paper.
There could be a lot to be gained from applying a similar approach to the propagation of
risk in the Delli Gatti network over time. Indeed, if any network could be modeled as a
series of fluctuating Erdös-Rení random graphs, the conclusions of E. Neir et al. could be
used to describe the time evolution of risk uncertainty, especially if the time-evolution of
the parameters of the Erdös-Rení map could be modeled. Such an exercise would, in
essence, be a return to Albin’s discussion of the predictability of a system; since not all
state conditions can be expected to produce predictive models which converge, it is
important to study, to whatever extent possible, the determinants of these conditions.
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III. The Model
A credit network model for production with an intermediate good
A version of the original model defined in Delli Gatti et al. (2006) in which three
layers of agents interact with one another in reaction to a stochastic final price is adopted
for analysis. A downstream industry produces goods for consumption at the final price, an
upstream industry produces inputs which are consumed by downstream firms and
financed by short term credit by the upstream firms. Both upstream and downstream
firms turn to the banking industry to finance their wage bills. The resulting network of
credit and productive relationships constitute the topology of the network model. By
assessing the experience of the correlation matrix of bank profits, this work will assess
the variability of observed risk under a varying topology.
The model produces a simulation of a credit market, with a stochastic final price
defining the profits of downstream firms, which must enter into relationships with
upstream producers and banks to secure capital goods and financing to cover the costs of
financing. In each timestep all downstream firms are presented with a new stochastic
price, and the experience of the network is defined over time by resulting experience of
these firms. Firms and banks are replaced after bankruptcy such that the topology of the

33

network is unaffected. This work studies profits in the banking sector over time by
iterating this simulation through several thousand timesteps.

Figure 1: Credit Network
Downstream firms produce based on their current net worth via the following
relationship, along with linear labor and capital requirement functions:

1)

𝛽

𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙𝐴𝑖𝑡 ; 𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑡 , 𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡

Where the firm’s output at time t 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is a function of its net worth A and the parameters 𝜙
and 𝛽. The requirement functions define the necessary labor and capital to produce 𝑌𝑖𝑡 by
the coefficients 𝛿𝑑 and 𝛾. Furthermore, labor unit-costs are defined as w and capital unitcosts p, such that the cost function (when all production is financed via carried profits)
can be given as:

2)

𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝑝𝐾𝑖𝑡

All downstream production is consumed at the stochastic final price 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~𝑈[0,2].
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Upstream firms produce capital inputs as intermediate goods in the downstream
production process. Upstream firms produce to fulfill downstream demand with an
analogous requirement function with only labor as an input:

3)

𝑌𝑗𝑡 = 𝐷𝑗𝑡 ; 𝑁𝑗𝑡 = 𝛿𝑢 𝑌𝑗𝑡 .

Upstream firms supply ½ of the demand for each of their proximate downstream
partners, such that the demand for the upstream firm’s production is:

4)

𝐷𝑢𝑡 = 1/2[𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑌(𝑖+1)𝑡 ].

(given the capital requirement function from (1)). Throughout the model the defining
characteristic is the topology of credit connections. All firms finance their production
through a combination of carried profits and credit relationships for the employment of
resources. Once production is realized, firms will have either netted sufficient revenue to
pay their creditors, or they will default. All firms rely on bank credit to finance their labor
inputs, such that the labor cost of production for the firm is given by:

5)

𝐶𝑛 = 𝛿𝑛 𝑌𝑛𝑡 𝑤(1 + 𝑟𝑛𝑏 ).

where 𝑛 = 𝑢 for upstream firms and d for downstream firms, 𝑟𝑛𝑏 is the interest rate
charged to the firm by the bank, 𝛿𝑛 is the labor requirement coefficient from (1) and (3),
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and w is the labor unit-cost, constant across all firms and all time steps. Additionally,
downstream firms enter into a credit agreement with upstream firms for the delivery of
capital inputs into the production process, such that the capital cost of the downstream
firm is given by:

6)

𝐶𝑑 = 𝛾𝑌𝑑𝑡 𝑝(1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑢 ).

where 𝑟𝑑𝑢 is the interest rate charged to downstream firms by upstream firms, p is the
price of capital goods, constant across firms and time, and 𝛾 is the capital requirement
coefficient from (1). Defaults, when they occur, are characterized by total loss on the part
of the creditor. Finally, the bankrupt agent is removed from the model and replaced in the
next time step with an agent with given starting net worth.
Banks supply credit based on a leverage limit:

7)

𝐿𝑠𝑧𝑡 = 𝐴𝑧𝑡 /𝛼

where 𝛼 is a regulatory target set by authorities which is invariant over the course of the
scenario and 𝐴𝑧𝑡 is the net worth of bank z at time t (while not addressed in this work, the
introduction of a government agent to set this limit based on various behavioral regimes
might provide insight into unintended policy effects). In the base model each bank is
connected via credit arrangements with one downstream and one upstream firm, and the
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number of these connections will increase as we restrict the size of the set of banks. The
assessed interest rate is given by the relationship

8)

𝐴

𝑏𝑢
𝑟𝑛𝑡
= 𝑘/( 𝐴̃𝑛𝑡 )^𝑘
𝑡

where A is the net worth of the nth firm, and 𝐴̃ is the median wealth of firms, calculated
separately among upstream and downstream banks (𝑛 = 𝑢 for upstream and 𝑛 = 𝑑 for
downstream). Finally, it is assumed that deposits, 𝐷𝑧𝑡 , are residual on banks’ balance
sheets, such that the sum of the credit supplied by the bank is covered by the value of the
bank’s carried profits and the value of the deposits: 𝐿𝑠 = 𝐷 + 𝐶 where C is carried profits
and D deposits. This yields the relationship: 𝐿𝑠 − 𝐷 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑡ℎ when all carried profit
is fully deployed in lending. A constant interest rate (𝑟𝑑 ) is assessed against deposits over
the duration of the simulation. Banks react to the aggregate demand of their partner firms
and, in the case in which they have insufficient credit available to meet the demand, turn
to the interbank market to raise funds. The interbank rate is constant over the duration of
the scenario, and default among banks leads to total loss on their creditors’ interbank
portfolios.
The scenario progresses according to the observed beginning asset values of the
downstream firms. Aggregate downstream production is calculated, and orders filter
upward to upstream firms for capital inputs and on to banks to finance the payment of
wages. Banks asses the incoming demand for credit against their credit supplies, attempt
to resolve credit constraints through the interbank market and transmit the available credit
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and derived interest rates to firms. Firms then adjust their production based on any
applicable credit constraints, and place their orders.
All downstream production is consumed at the stochastic price, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . If a
downstream firm fails to receive a sufficient price to prevent bankruptcy it defaults
completely on its credit agreements. Thus, a downstream firm’s bankruptcy increases the
bankruptcy risk for both its supplier and bank. Additionally, the increased likelihood of
bank default can serve to “infect” the broader banking system via borrowing on the
interbank market.
Since all production is contingent upon the network of credit connections within
the economy, the distribution of returns is highly dependent on the time-evolution of the
interbank market. Credit constraints can pose a real restriction on the pace of growth, and
since the interest rates are assessed against firms based upon their performance against
the median in their industry, banks servicing “successful” firms operate on thinner
margins and can garner lower profit, whereas those banks servicing frail firms might
realize greater potential profits, but at a higher risk. Realized returns in the banks’
portfolios up to and including default have real effects on the likelihood of any given
bank leveraging the interbank market. A default on a given bank’s balance sheet can
depress its capital cushion and necessitate a deepening of its credit relationship with its
neighbor banks. Additionally, those banks replacing bankrupt banks can require outside
investment (read “borrowing on the interbank market”) to service their partner firms.
When default occurs, the potential for contagion runs only as deep as the credit
connections that exist between banks, thus, a comprehensive characterization of the
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correlation among banks will serve as a useful expression of the effects of changing
network topologies.
It is interesting to note that the model essentially operates within the restrictive
bounds of utility maximizing behavior. Due to the static nature of the credit network and
the stochastic price element, all firms are price takers in their respective markets. The
addition of competition or differentiation in agent’s choice algorithms could only be
expected to increase the degree of observed complexity. Interesting extensions are likely
possible into the question of market power and further heterogeneity among agents.

Perignon and Smith’s Diversification Coefficient
In Delli Gatti et al. (2006 and 2010) the model above (although with drastic
alterations in the later paper) was run to various specifications. However, the basic
identity, 𝑁𝑢 = 𝑁𝑑 = 𝑁𝑏 where 𝑁𝑥 is the size of the set of each industry, is held constant
across simulations. The following results, then, will be assessed against a series of
simulations of the above model with a varying number of banks. Once the scenarios are
run, the results are analyzed according to Perignon and Smith (2010), in which a Value at
Risk (a measure of the boundary, usually 1 or 5% upper tail of the 1-day ahead
expectation for loss) approach is leveraged to study diversification in various portfolios
of bank credits. In this analysis the net worth of banks are formalized as a portfolio with
returns given by bank profit in each period and Perignon and Smith’s diversification
coefficient is used to assess the time evolution of the level of correlation across sections
of the economy. In the context of the Copula approach to derivative pricing we are quite
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literally examining the state conditions of the credit market (and how difficult prediction
based on such models may become). Since copula functions are quite sensitive to changes
in the correlation matrix, severe variation will imply that state changes in the topology of
the credit network fundamentally affect the ability of such predictive models to obtain.
From Perignon and Smith (2010):

1)

𝛿=

∑𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖 −𝐷𝑉𝐴𝑅
∑𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖

In the above context ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖 , the sum of the individual VaRs of credits in the
portfolio, is given through the identity:

2)

𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑖 = 𝑘𝜎𝑖 𝑥𝑖

where k is a scale parameter varying with the shape of the distribution (here
assumed normal for ease of derivation: k=2.33), and 𝑥𝑖 is the dollar position in the asset,
in this case the standard deviation of returns is assessed against changes in net worth.
Since net worth is itself taken to be the dollar position, 𝑥𝑖 can be omitted. The sum of the
individual VaRs of credits across a portfolio is equal to the VaR of the total portfolio only
if the asset correlation of the portfolio’s constituent credits is perfect. In all cases some
imperfect level of correlation will obtain between credits, and the extent to which credits
are uncorrelated will depress the Value at Risk of the portfolio as a whole. The
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calculation of DVaR (or diversified value at risk, see Perignon and Smith 2010 for a
complete derivation) is given by:

3)

𝐷𝑉𝑎𝑅 = √𝑉′𝑅𝑉

where V is a column vector of the individual VaRs within the portfolio and R is
the asset correlation matrix. The diversification coefficient 𝛿 in (1) ranges from 0 to 1
measuring the percentage deviation from a perfectly correlated portfolio due to the
structure of the correlation matrix of a portfolio’s constituent credits, a higher value for
the diversification coefficient will imply a weaker correlation structure and lower viseversa. Note that in all cases this analysis will be conducted against the profits of the
various banks. Should deep credit relationships develop between banks, they will serve as
unrealized avenues of correlation until default occurs. Without fully quantifying the
nature and depth of the various credit relationships in the network (something we could
not expect the various participants to be capable of due to informational constraints)
statistical estimation of risk will be “surprised” by the strength of correlation during
downside shocks. Characterization of the resulting mispricing requires a deeper
discussion of both the development over time of the credit relationships among firms and
banks and the determinants and effects of default.
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IV. The determinants of the correlation matrix:
What follows is a technical examination of the determinants and nature of default
probabilities at each level of the network, and the methods by which bankruptcy risk
propagates. It will be especially necessary to study the development of two conditions,
bankruptcy and credit constraints, the first being the only mechanism by which second
and higher order effects (default cascades) can be felt through the model, and the second
being the determining factor of the strength of those higher order effects.

Notice that the expression of the profit of the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ downstream firm at time t is
given by:

1)

𝜋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (𝑌𝑖𝑡 ) − (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑢 )𝑝𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑏 )𝑤𝛿𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑡

(from 1,2,5, and 6 in section 3.1) It is immediately apparent that the distribution of profit
for an individual downstream firm is largely independent of the profit of an adjacent
downstream firm (for initial analysis the effect of 𝑟𝑑𝑏 , which is partially determined by the
median worth of the downstream sector, is assumed to be negligible). Thus, the likelihood
of default of a downstream firm, 𝑃[𝜋𝑖𝑡 < −𝐴𝑖𝑡 ], is iid ∀ i aside interest rate effects.
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Likewise we can see that the profit of the 𝑗 𝑡ℎ upstream firm is given by:

2)

1

1

𝜋𝑗𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟𝑑𝑢 )𝑝𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡 − (1 + 𝑟𝑢𝑏 )𝑤𝛿𝑢 (2 𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 2 𝛾𝑌(𝑖+1)𝑡 ) − 𝐵𝐷

(from 3,4, and 5 in 3.1) where BD is the aggregate value of credit supplied to
downstream firms which defaulted in time t. By extension it can be seen that:

3)

𝑃[𝜋𝑗𝑖 < −𝐴𝑗𝑡 ] ∝ 𝑃[𝜋𝑖𝑡 < −𝐴𝑖𝑡 ]∀𝑖 ∈ Ζ, 𝑤𝛿𝑢 , 𝑟𝑢𝑏

Where 𝑃[𝜋𝑗𝑡 < −𝐴𝑗𝑡 ] is the likelihood of collapse for the upstream firm j at time t, Ζ is
the set of debtors of j, wδu is the implied cost multiplier for the labor cost of the upstream
firm, and 𝑟𝑢𝑏 is the interest rate charged by the bank to the upstream firm. It is apparent
that the distribution of returns to the upstream firm’s investment will approximate the
copula function 𝐶 = Φ(𝜙 −1 (𝐴𝑖 )∀𝑖 ∈ Ζ, Σ) where sigma is the identity matrix, since the
asset values of all of its downstream partners are independent absent interest rate effects.
Considering that the implication is that the observation of bankruptcy for any element of
Ζ has no effect on the likelihood of default for any other element, it can be deduced that:

4)

𝑃[𝜋𝑗𝑡 < −𝐴𝑗𝑡 ] ∝ ∏𝑥𝑖=1 𝑃[𝜋𝑖𝑡 < −𝐴𝑖𝑡 ]

Where x is the number of bankruptcies in Ζ necessary to induce bankruptcy in u. Since
the expected value of each downstream firm i at time t is identical save for credit
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constraints and interest rate disparities driven by banks’ perception of solvency in firms,
the expected weight of each downstream firm is identical. Thus, the likelihood that a
sufficient number of firms default to force default in j is:

5)

𝑃[𝜋𝑗𝑡 < −𝐴𝑗𝑡 ] ≈ ∏𝑥𝑖=1 𝑃[𝜋𝑖𝑡 < −𝐴𝑖𝑡 ]

and falls exponentially with N, the number of firms in Ζ, ceteris paribus. Concentration at
the level of the upstream firm is the perfect example of diversification absent interest
rates, since the defaults of i firms are iid.
It is not the case, however, that the survival times of the j and j+1 upstream firms
are uncorrelated. In the initial case first described by Delli Gatti et al. (2006), the ith
downstream firm receives half of its required capital input from upstream firms j and j+1,
and thus the incidence of default in the ith downstream firm appreciably increases the
likelihood of default for both upstream firms. That, however, is as far as the shock can be
transmitted, absent the interest rate mechanism noted above. The conditional probability
of default in the 𝑗 𝑡ℎ upstream firm is contingent upon only the observation of default in
the j+1 and j-1 upstream firms. A shock cannot be transferred further until it is significant
enough to affect the median net worth in the industry or should the supplying bank face
difficulty repaying its obligations on the interbank market.
Additionally, given that time evolution of profit for the upstream firm is given by:
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6)

𝛽
𝑗
𝑗
𝜋𝑗𝑡 = ∑𝑖∈Ζ[(1 + 𝑟𝑗𝑡𝑖 ) − (1 + 𝑟𝑧𝑡 )𝑤𝛿𝑢 ]𝛾𝜙𝐴𝑖𝑡 + (1 + 𝑟𝑧𝑡 )𝐴𝑗𝑡 ; (𝐴𝑗𝑡 being

the value of carried profits financing production)

If we maintain that the upstream firm shares the demand of the ultimate
downstream firms (such that Ζj ∩ 𝑍𝑗+1 contains only one downstream firm). The strength
of the correlation between two adjacent upstream firms would fall if the size of Ζ were to
increase.
When we consider the effect of the bank’s interest rate decisions upon the default
and asset value correlations of the up and downstream firms we notice that the interest
rate decision is given by:

7)

𝐴𝑦𝑡

𝑏𝑥
𝑟𝑦𝑡
= 𝑘/(𝐴̃ )^𝑘
𝑥𝑡

Where 𝐴𝑦𝑡 is the net worth of a given upstream or downstream firm at time t (y=i, x=d
for downstream and y=j, x=u for upstream) 𝐴̃ is the median net worth of firms at time t,
computed separately for upstream and downstream firms. The interest rate decision
includes a dual force component. First, it acts on the individual firm by reinforcing its
divergence from the median. Weaker firms will face more stringent borrowing costs and
stronger firms vice versa. Secondly, interest rates rise as the industry’s median falls
further increasing systemic weaknesses after negative shocks. Within any given industry,
however, the effects of the interest rate mechanism on pairwise correlations are minimal.
To the extent that it does have an effect, the mechanism reinforces comovement in the
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previous period, and provides minor resistance to correlation between firms whose profits
did not exhibit comovement in the period prior. The division of the sectors into banks that
serve as nodes of credit provision and their constituent firms likely interacts with these
factors to produce long range dependence and the observed variability of the correlation
matrix.
Leaving aside concentration in the upstream markets for the moment, we can see
that for the bank, then, a shift in network topology towards increased concentration
doesn’t necessarily decrease the likelihood of default. Each upstream credit in the bank’s
portfolio has a positive default correlation with the credits of adjacent firms, and the
downstream firms associated with them. Furthermore, banks will readily employ idle
balances on the interbank market, both to fill unmatched demand for credit, and to supply
short term liquidity to their neighbors in the case of liquidity crises. As the depth of these
interbank credits increase, possible correlation among banks becomes increasingly
variable. Through the interbank market, then, there exists an unbounded transmission
mechanism. In essence a seemingly stable “equilibrium” may bifurcate from a strong
attractor in the dynamic sense (the sector quickly recovers from a single bank’s default)
to a weak one (a single bank’s default leads to systemic problems). Thus, the observation
of default of a single downstream firm can increase the likelihood of the observation of
default for the entire banking sector (with a decreasing effect further out along the
network). Furthermore, negative shocks increase the fragility of the system in two ways.
First, negative shocks decrease the net worth of firms and banks. Second, to the extent
that the banks which experienced negative shocks turn to the interbank market to either
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match demand for credit or to cover liability crises, negative shocks deepen the liability
structure. As is seen from the time evolution of profits in the zth bank:

8)

𝜋𝑧𝑡 = ∑𝑖∈Ζ𝑗 𝑟𝑑𝑏 𝑤𝛿𝑑 𝐴𝑖𝑡 + ∑𝑗∈Λz 𝑟𝑢𝑏 𝑤𝛿𝑢 𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝑟 𝑏𝑏 𝐼𝐵 − 𝐵𝐷 − 𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝐷

where IB is the position of bank z on the interbank market, BD the value of bad debt on
the bank’s balance sheet, Λ z is the set of upstream firms with credit connections to the zth
bank, and Ζj is the set of downstream firms with credit connections to the jth upstream
firm. It can be noted that the risk profile of the bank is determined by the size of the
positions the bank has taken in the various markets. When the bank’s balance sheet is
weighed towards the up and downstream markets, the bank’s expected value is
characterized by the correlations among its own credits. By contrast, when the bank’s
balance sheet is weighed toward interbank lending, default can occur even in the presence
of strong performance in the rest of its portfolio. The experience of the concentrated
network is not trivially an expression of the aggregated experience of the banks in the
diffuse network, much larger portions of the banking sector can be effected negatively
following an identical downstream experience. When such negative impacts occur, the
fragility of the entire system is increased, raising the likelihood of a departure from a
convergent expression of the network’s expected “equilibrium”.
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V. Results
The model was run first against a network with 100 members of each set of firms:
upstream, downstream and banks. The simulations covered periods of 2500 timesteps,
and results are examined against time steps beyond 500. Subsequent model specifications
decrease the number of banks first to 50, and then 25, such that in the base model each
bank has credit connections with a single upstream and downstream firm, in the second
case each bank has credit connections with four downstream-upstream firm pairs and
finally eight in the concentrated case.

Figure 2: Increasing concentration at the bank level

A theoretical portfolio is then constructed from the resulting net worth of the banks
given by the iterations of the model. By examining the exhibited evolution of the correlation
matrix among these banks via Perignon and Smith’s diversification coefficient, the
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predictability of the theoretical portfolio can be formalized. It is shown that the variable
depth of credit connections imposes an increasing degree of uncertainty on this portfolio as
the banking sector is constricted, as the effect of unrealized avenues of correlation on the
interbank market are generalized to ever larger portions of the portfolio. The structure of the
correlation matrix can exhibit strong bifurcation. The following three specific statistical
artifacts support this conclusion.

Kurtosis in single period returns:

single period returns:
25 banks, Kurtosis = 6.5

single period returns:
50 Banks, Kurtosis = 3.0
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single period returns:
100 Banks, Kurtosis = -0.1
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Figure 3: Kurtosis in single period returns

A marked increase in the kurtosis on single period profits to the banking sector is
observed to correlate with increasing concentration among banks. Visual inspection
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shows a nearly Brownian time evolution of profit degrading into a signal that bifurcates
between periods of more or less normal returns and periods of abnormal profit,
punctuated by a large loss before returning to normal profits. Importantly, the somewhat
noisy emergent profit in the 50 bank case collapses to a stable signal punctuated by large
breaks in the 25 bank case. Complex interactions between the ability of increasingly large
nodes to “cover” occasional failures in the productive sectors and the effect of systemic
risk due to increasingly deep credit connections can, to some extent, explain the
qualitative change. As the credit network becomes concentrated, the true level of risk in
downstream and upstream firms is masked by greater bank assets. As these lower level
failures remain unobserved, the likelihood of failures large enough to be transmitted
along the interbank market diverges from observed frequency of normal failure.
Furthermore, the effect of “hidden” avenues of correlation realized under default
increases in the aggregate as larger portions of total assets are tied up in close proximity
to any bank default. (Remember that the likely effect of cascades on the interbank market
dissipates with distance. A concentrated interbank market provides much less space for
dissipation and a much less varied experience.)

Kurtosis in diversification over time:
Of course, multiple factors could conspire to lead to kurtosis in bank profits. Delli
Gatti et al (2006 and 2010) show the development of kurtosis in firms’ experiences due to
the nature of credit constraints and supplier connections in the productive sectors. In
order to study the development of asset correlation among banks in particular, Perignon
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and Smith’s diversification coefficient is assessed against a rolling window of 200
observations. Over time the dynamics of this diversification coefficient should accurately
present the nature of the diversification of the correlation matrix, and by extension model
the variability of the credit-network topology and thus the viability of predictive
modeling. More precisely, the diversification coefficient captures the dynamics of the
correlation matrix as current risk evaluation methods would, observed kurtosis and
variability in the experience of the diversification coefficient will imply the sudden
realization of potential correlation (via credit-network topology) which would result in
severe mispricing of risk:
Evolution of δ over time: 25 banks

Evolution of δ over time: 50 Banks
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Evolution of δ over time: 100 Banks
1
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Figure 4: evolution of 𝛿 over time.

0

By visual inspection δ exhibits an increasing degree of variability with the
concentration of the network. In the context of this credit network, the variability of the
correlation matrix speaks to the strength of the realized connections among the banks
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constituting this “portfolio” and the resulting correlations in profits over time. There are
two avenues by which comovement in profits can arise in the model. First, if firms grow
more quickly than their partner banks, the demand for credit can outpace the supply
available from their supplying bank, in which case other banks either view the bank as a
profit opportunity and invest their excess profits in it (through the extension of credits as
described above) or growth is constrained. Such dependencies can persist over multiple
periods, leading to possible long run dependence in the time evolution of the
diversification coefficient. Additionally, such dependencies effectively generate elevated
downside risk, as any bankruptcy in a single bank is more likely to cause a bankruptcy
cascade that “infects” other parts of the network. Second, single period losses can lead to
increased fragility in the system by causing the redistribution of excess profits to cover
the troubled bank. In either case a statistical assessment would be blind to the magnitude
of the resulting increase in risk. Should a node with “deep” network connections
experience failure, the resulting bankruptcy cascade could be severe, cascading to
multiple nodes along the chain. The two interact in a complex manner and the emergent
behavior exhibited in the panel above gives evidence to the increasing importance of
these inter-node effects in the concentrated model.
The above results show that the diversification coefficient, as an expression of the
correlation matrix, exhibits qualitatively different time evolution dependent on the level
of concentration in the model. However, a statistical expression of this variability is
complicated by difficulties in accurately assessing long run dependence, see CITATION
for a discussion. Examining the first difference of the diversification coefficient yields
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convincing concrete results in support of the hypothesis that increasing concentration
(and the resulting “masking” of effective risk) yields divergence in risk assessment:
First difference of δ:
25 Banks (kurtosis = 36.7)

First difference of δ:
50 Banks (kurtosis = 38.0)
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Figure 5: Increasing concentration at the bank level

Visual inspection again shows a strong increase in the variability of the implied
correlation structure of the banking sector; critically, kurtosis in the above first
differences of the evaluated Value-at-Risk increases in the restricted models. This
observed increase in kurtosis is due to the unobserved risk inherent to the concentrated
case; the concentration of constituent credits into ever larger “portfolios” (ie. the banks’
balance sheets) induces imperfect diversification within the bank’s balance sheets, and
masks the development of risky structures until they are “realized” through loss. The
occurrence of a multi-period loss in any given bank remains constant or declines as
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concentration increases. However, the resulting effect on the magnitude of loss is
drastically increased as larger portions of the banking sector are “tied up” in the fortunes
of a single bank. The results were additionally found to be robust as an expression of the
mean experience of a test of 50 iterations of the simulation under each model
specification.

Net Worth
Finally, the number of banks operating in the market appears to have an effect on
the time evolution of net worth in the economy. In the following three scenarios the
aggregate net worth of the banking sector in initial conditions remains unchanged. As in
the previous exploration, the number of banks is restricted:
Net worth, 100 Banks

Net Worth, 50 Banks
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100

1

1

Net Worth 25 Banks
1000000
10000
100
1

Figure 6: Net Worth
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As the number of banks declines growth in the economy collapses. Stationarity
forms the lower bound due to the construction of the model, as firms are not allowed to
hold negative net worth and furthermore all bankruptcies are replaced by a firm with a set
“initial” net worth.
Remember that the supply of credit is determined by the prudential lending target,
𝐿𝑧𝑡 = 𝐴𝑧𝑡 /𝛼, where 𝐴𝑧𝑡 is the net worth of bank z at time t, 𝛼 is a statutory capital ratio,
and 𝐿𝑧𝑡 is the supply of credit from bank z at time t. If defaults occur too frequently, or
are too severe, banks remain unable to grow net worth to support the growing economy
and the economy becomes credit constrained. In fact, from the results above, it would
appear that the trade off created by concentrated financial markets – less frequent but
more sever failures – does not lead to a long run increase in the total welfare of the
economy. The severity of the downside risk during cascades is sufficient to more than
overcome the improved performance during normal periods.
In the progression from a disperse network with 𝑁𝑑 = 𝑁𝑢 = 𝑁𝑏 to the
concentrated case 𝑁𝑑 = 𝑁𝑢 = 4𝑁𝑏 , we can see that the magnitude of downside risk in the
economy grows substantially. This supports the earlier observation that dependencies in
the correlation matrix on the level of connection and concentration in the model could
cause severe mispricing in models based on the assumption of convergence. In the
unconcentrated case, the law of large numbers pushes correlations in asset values to
cancel, and the structure approaches perfect independence in losses. Although, it should
be noted that even in the unconcentrated case profits still exhibit some kurtosis due to the
connections on the interbank and product markets. Furthermore, it can be seen that the
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bifurcation of the network into periods of variable correlation is dependent on the depth
of interbank connections, which intensify with weaknesses in the banking sector.
Intuitively, the destruction of these avenues of correlation would yield actual perfect
independence in the case of a non-connected network (ie. If there were no interbank
market and if the credit connections between firms interacted in isolation and the assets
of no two banks were in any way structurally connected). It would be perhaps a valuable
contribution to extend the framework used to model an Erdös-Rení map of a network
economy (Nier et al. 2009) to the limit case of absolute connection and absolute
fragmentation to arrive at these same results. Intuitively, failure in the “absolute”
connection case would treat the banking industry as a single bank, which would obscure
all failures save those extensive enough to overcome profits from elsewhere, yielding
either complete catastrophe or the appearance of stability. The case of absolute
fragmentation may, by contrast, yield a perfectly Brownian structure. Critically, both the
increase of long run dependence and kurtosis evidence the variability of the state
conditions upon which an assessment of risk in the sector would necessarily be based.
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VI. Conclusions
Minsky’s Financial Instability in the emergent behavior of the model
Having discussed the nature of default and asset correlations in the Delli Gatti et
al. (2006) network economy it is now possible to address the fundamental determinants
of the shape of the correlation matrix and their possible applications in a broader family
of interconnected systems. The genesis of extreme moments of correlation among
significant proportions of the network is an act of the strength of interfirm connections.
“Grouping” these connection points into larger elements then has the effect of tying
together the effects of failure in portions of the market. The greater share of assets
dedicated to providing a form of collateral for failure indeed lessens the likelihood of low
level failure. However, it should be noted that credit constraints enter the picture as a
constraint on growth, when failure effects large sectors of the banking industry, the other
industries’ growth can be constrained in the long term. There is a dual effect here. First,
the concentrated financial system produces increased stability punctuated by periods of
extreme asset correlation merely through the variable depth of credit connections. These
extreme periods of correlation exacerbate downside risk and lead to a disorderly
breakdown of the usual “equilibrium” dynamics, fundamentally frustrating risk valuation.
The variance in the depth of those corrections is dependent on the experience of the
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network, reinforcing the strength of correlation as banks increase their credit connections
due to difficulty or opportunity. Second, when failure occurs, recovery is rendered more
difficult even when real conditions support robust recovery due to credit constraints. (Is
the crux of this argument the effect of a reactive reinforcement of credit connections as
occurred in the CDS arrangements in 2007?)
Both the time evolution of banking sector profits and the variation over time of
the correlation matrix of bank returns evidence the dynamic development of
interdependencies in the banking sector. As differences in growth rates between firms and
banks are aggravated by the interest rate mechanism, conditions can develop allowing
portions of the banking sector to deploy their excess balances elsewhere in the sector,
possibly developing subsidizing dependencies that can last over multiple periods. Since
the potential downside risk is not realized until bankruptcy occurs, an unrealized risk can
develop through avenues of credit dependency. If a bank with a higher risk profile
requires credit through the interbank (or any other) market, creditors in the Delli Gatti
model view the requirement as an investment opportunity, and not as risk. Indeed, if
information about credit connections is proprietary, it becomes impossible for a lender to
ascertain the true risk profile of another bank until bankruptcy actually occurs.
To the extent that these dependency structures exist, they can be understood as
emergent behavior loosely modeling Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. Minsky
asserts that two separate but interconnected phenomena drive the development of
financial structures which rely increasingly upon external financing. In Minsky’s model
three types of financing schema exist, Hedge, Speculation and Ponzi. In hedge finance
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units are able to operate completely on their income account, all investment is financed
via carried profits, and debts coming due are paid entirely out of profit. Speculative
finance requires that debts coming due be paid at least partially by new debts, the balance
sheet is rolled forward. Finally, Ponzi finance requires that debts be financed entirely by
new debt, and represents an increase without bound of the indebtedness of the agent.
Since all debts are liquid at the end of every timestep, this exact progression is rendered
impossible by the structure of the model. However, the development and collapse over
time of external finance dependent structures serves as an analogy for Minsky’s
hypothesis. Banks bifurcate between self-sufficient and dependent states (essentially,
although not precisely, between hedge and speculative finance), as in the Financial
Instability hypothesis, a dependent bank serves to increase systemic risk. Indeed it should
be striking that we observe the extreme effects we do even in such a restricted model. It
could easily be expected that an accurate agent based reproduction allowing for the
development of Ponzi finance would exhibit more extreme behavior. Moreover, a
government agent is not included in the above model, as in Minsky’s formulation, and the
introduction of such an agent could as easily reinforce the effects highlighted throughout
this paper as mitigate them. The exact nature of Government policy, and its implications
for the financial accelerator in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) could be the subject of future
research.
At this stage, the strength of the connection between Minsky and the literature on
Network effects in financial markets is nascent. The endogenous instability of the
financial markets tie the two together and it could be asserted that Minsky described
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qualitatively the quantitative expressions of network effects. The increasing depth of
financial connections across a financial system serves as a potential conductor of
financial risk. In general, these channels of possible contagion go unrecognized until their
potential is realized, at which point, of course, it is too late. Indeed, it should be
recognized that even in the above model, in which we know the exact credit topology of
the network, we would be hard pressed to predict the behavior accurately. The reality is
likely much more complex. In such a context, Minsky describes the mechanisms by
which both the number of these channels is augmented, and the likelihood that failure
occurs at any given point. As an economy progresses toward Ponzi finance, the relative
value (indebtedness) and number (interconnectedness) of credit relationships augments,
increasing the likelihood of failures with systemic effects. The types of parameters
defined in an Erdos-Reni map, then, could serve as work in the direction of defining a
measure of Systemic Risk, a concept which has received much attention in the years since
the financial crisis but for which there is very little definite understanding.
The difficulties of defining systemic risk are real, due to the fundamental nature
of interconnected systems, there exist patterns of reactive behavior that defy prediction.
Additionally, even under such restrictive assumptions of agent choice as defined above
(in fact, in Delli Gatti et al. 2006 agents are not imbued with choice, however, in the
subsequent 2010 paper an agent choice matrix is presented which fails to mitigate the
effects and in fact reinforces them), unpredictable patterns of behavior arise fairly rapidly.
While it is true that prediction may be possible over some finite time horizon, or under
some assumed conditions (such as those assumed in the formulation of copula and matrix
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decomposition methods of portfolio risk evaluation), it should by now be apparent that to
the extent that knowledge about network topology is unavailable to agents, the set of
conditions under which future behavior is predictable is finite and smaller than the set of
possible future conditions. Should potential systemic risk as characterized by potential
avenues of contagion be realized, predictable behavior can rapidly degenerate into a
future time path of behavior that is unknowable.
To what extent, exactly, is future behavior unknowable? It may be, again echoing
the sentiments of Minsky and Albin, that the formulation of the research project
approached by financial economists is in some way incomplete. While there is likely
value in predicting more precisely the time evolution of profits within the economy under
those state conditions which allow prediction, the pursuit of this research project in
isolation or without the simultaneous pursuit of a body of study attempting to define
those state conditions which might render such predictions invalid and the likelihood that
these state conditions might obtain, can lead to the extremely damaging development of
irrational exuberance (which, in the context of this paper could be seen as further
reinforcing the likelihood of just such a state condition bifurcation). A careful
examination of the financial crisis quickly shows that unrealistic expectations obtained
across large portions of the financial sector, with the complex CDO and CDS instruments
at their core. A large body of writing exists on this subject, see Crotty, Wolfe or any
number of others for further review (Crotty 2009). An area that is greatly lacking at this
moment, then, is a program of study attempting to define the probable causes of systemic
bifurcations.
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Real World applications
One could consider the financial accelerator to be one element of a superset of
network effects. Any risk sharing scheme, should there be the possibility of network
effects affecting default and asset correlations, will develop into Ponzi finance, as the
structure exhibits concentration about the mean punctuated by extreme departure. If
timescales fail to extend to compensate for structural changes, the increase in kurtosis
will remain unobserved by actors in the economy. Worse, the structure will appear to the
endogenous actor to be in a progression towards a state of greater stability. The effects of
the model are agnostic to the method by which concentrations are introduced into the
model, in Delli Gatti et al. (2010) the concentration is the result of an endogenous choice
mechanism, other structures emphasize confidence effects, effects of moral hazards,
government policy, or any number of incentive schemes. It’s likely that all of the above
have obtained in the past 40 years; the exhibited path over the decades leading up to the
financial crisis has been a determinant of multiple factors, including Federal Reserve
strategy in the case of bank failure, deregulation in financial markets, and “innovation”
leading to the creation and pricing of new financial instruments. All of these
developments have resulted in a more concentrated financial system, and there is ample
evidence that the incentive structure of financial markets have tended to reinforce the
effects.
The result, as illustrated by the agent based approach taken in the model studied
here (among others) is that any reliance on mean field approximations to support
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predictions of future behavior made from aggregate expressions of system position is
fundamentally flawed, especially as the network connections become increasingly dense.
“Network Effects” dominate in the limit. Past and current expressions of systemic risk
have tended to rely casually on the net position of a financial market: observers noted in
the early days of the credit crisis that the net exposure of the financial industry to
subprime securities was something on the order of 200 billion, not a large figure in the
context of the size of the market. However, through largely unobserved liability structures
such as the now infamous (although ubiquitous) CDS, the effects of the small net
aggregate exposure ballooned into likely greater than $2 trillion in destroyed wealth. A
variety of factors, of course, were present in the expressed patterns of loss in the financial
crisis, including liquidity problems deriving from a lack of confidence in institutions,
sometimes in cases in which the institution had very little exposure. However, it was the
complex nature of the credit topology of the financial network that led to risk becoming
unknowable (which is quite obviously connected to the crisis of confidence that
occurred). A single firm, or small subset of firms, which fail to cover their liabilities can
lead to large effects in the emergent behavior of the system, aggregate effects are not
expressed by the aggregation of individual effects. In short, Network effects matter.
The existing literature on ABM has focused largely on the explanation of results
considered anomalous in the context of the neoclassical synthesis. In their recognition of
the destabilizing effects of the complex interactions possible in networks characterized by
heterogeneous interacting agents, agent based models have a clear advantage over models
expressing the trajectories of economic systems in terms of aggregate statistics. A good
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application of the results of such models to the development of economic forecasting is
yet to be produced. It is my hope that this work will help to inform that body of study.
Perhaps the clearest conclusion of the above is that the question of forecasting must be
necessarily broadened, especially in the context of the estimation of uncertainty.
Following from the work of Albin, it is recognized that not all state conditions produce
models whose future trajectories are predictable in a computational sense. If state
conditions are variable, and studies in financial psychology should lead us to believe that
they are in fact subject to bifurcation, more research is needed to study the conditions for
this bifurcation. This study has technically proceeded entirely outside of the framework
of choice and yet such state condition bifurcations are shown to be possible, future work
would benefit from an increased understanding of just such conditions. If possible,
descriptions of expectation for state conditions are critical, including as well increased
effort in discovering how non-salient conditions might come to dominate system
dynamics. The question of the degree to which any of the above is possible is of critical
importance, and requires more attention than has been paid to it in current works.

64

65

VII. Bibliography
Alan, Kirman. “Learning in Agent-Based Models” Eastern Economic Journal, 37.1
(Winter 2011): 20-27.
Albin, Peter S. Barriers and Bounds to Rationality Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1998.
Araujo, Aloisio, Alain Chateauneuf, José Heleno Faro. “Pricing rules and Arrow-Debreu
ambiguous valuation” Economic Theory, 49.1 (): 1-35
Ang, James, Yingmei Cheng. “Financial Innovations and Market Efficiency: The Case for
Single Stock Futures” Journal of Applied Finance, 15.1 (Spring 2005): 38-51.
Arrow, K.J. “The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-Bearing” The
Review of Economic Studies, 31.2 (Apr 1964): 91-96
Axtell, Robert “Zipf distribution of US firm sizes” Science, 293.5536 (2001): 1818-1820
Battison S, D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald, J.E. Stiglitz. “Credit chains and
bankruptcy propagation in production networks” Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 31.6 (2007): 2061-2084.
Böhm, Volker, George Vachadze. “Capital Accumulation with Tangible Assets” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 68.1 (Oct. 2008) 248-257.

66

Chakraborti, Anirban, Ioane Muni Toke, Marco Patriarca, Frederic Abernel.
“Econophysics Review: II. Agent Based Models” Quantitative Finance, 11.7
(2011): 1013-1041.
Crotty, James “Structural causes of the global financial crisis: a critical assessment of the
‘new financial architecture’”. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33.4 (2009): 563580.
Davidson, Paul. “Thinking about the crisis: Alternative explanations of the operation of a
capitalist economy” Challenge, 52.6 (2009): 5-28
Davidson, Paul “Behavioral economists should make a turn and learn from Keynes and
Post Keynesian economics” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, 33.2 (Winter
2010-11): 251-254
Delli Gatti, Domenico, Mauro Gallegati, Bruce Greenwald, Alberto Russo, Joseph E.
Stiglitz. “The financial accelerator in an evolving credit network” Journal of
Economic Dynamics & Control 34 (2010): 1627-1650
Duehl, Adrian J, Frank H. Koch, Fred P. Hain. “Southern pine beetle regional outbreaks
modeled on landscape climate and infestation history” Forest Ecology and
Management, 261.3 (2011): 473-479.
Eavis, Peter. “Greek Crisis Raises New Fears Over Credit-Default Swaps” Dealbook.
February 21, 2012. (http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/greek-crisis-raisesnew-fears-over-credit-default-swaps/)
Eichberger, Jürgen, David Kelsey. “Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous?”
Economic Theory, 48(2-3). (2011): 331-339.
67

Farmer, J. Doyne. “Market Force, Ecology and Evolution” Industrial and Corporate
Change, 11.5 (2002): 895-953
Greenwald, Bruce, Joseph Stiglitz. Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2003).
Greenwald, Bruce, Joseph Stiglitz. “Imperfect information finance constraints and
business fluctuations” M. Kohn, S.C. Tsiang (Eds.), Finance constraints
expectations and macroeconomics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (1988): 03–
140.
Hay Collin. “Good Inflation, Bad inflation: the housing boom, economic growth and the
disaggregation of inflationary preferences in the UK and Ireland” The British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 11 (2009): 461-478
Hu, Jian. “Assessing the credit risk of CDOs backed by structured finance securities:
rating analysts’ challenges and solutions” The Journal of Structured Finance, 13.3
(Dec 2007): 43.
Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of employment, interest, and money New
York: Harcout, 1964
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
Krugman, Paul. “Vector Autoregressions and Keynesian Macro.” The Conscience of a
Liberal. October 17, 2011. (http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/vectorautoregressions-and-keynesian-macro/)
Li, David “On Default Correlation a copula function approach” Journal of Fixed income,
9.4 (Mar 2000): 43-54
68

Linsmeier, Thomas J, Niel D. Pearson. “Value at Risk” Financial Analysts Journal, 56.2
(Mar/Apr 2000): 47
Malkiel, B. “Efficient Market Hypothesis” New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and
Finance. London, MacMillan (1992).
Mandlebrot, Benoit. “The Variation of certain speculative prices” The Journal of
Business, 36.4 (Oct. 1963): 394-419.
Mancini, Loriano, Fabio Trojani. “Robust Value at Risk Prediction” Journal of Financial
Econometrics, 0.0 (2011): 1-33.
Mizgier, Kamil J, Stephan M. Wagner, Janusz A. Holyst. “Modeling Defaults of
Companies in Multi-Stage Supply Chain Networks” International Journal of
Production Economics, 135.1 (Jan 2012): 14-23.
Miller, Douglas J, Wei-Han Liu. “Improved estimation of portfolio value-at-risk under
copula models with mixed marginal” Journal of Futures Markets, 26.10 (Dec
2007): 997-1018
Minsky, Hyman. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company. (2008)
Nier, Erlend, Jing Yang, Tanju Yorulmazer, Amadeo Alentorn. “Network Models and
Financial Stability” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31 (2007): 20332060
Ozun, Alper, Atilla Cifter. “Portfolio Value at Risk with time-varying copula: Evidence
from Latin America.” Journal of Applied Sciences, 7.14 (Dec 2007): 1916-1923

69

Pérignon, Christophe, Daniel R. Smith. “Diversification and Value-at-Risk” Journal of
Banking and Finance, 34.1 (2010):55-66.
Pra, Paolo Dai, Marco Tolotti. “Heterogenous credit portfolios and the dynamics of the
aggregate losses” Stochastic Processes and their Applications, 119 (2009): 29132944
Rajan, Uday, Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig. “Statistical Default Models and Incentives”
American Economic Review, 100 (May 2010): 506-510
Stiglitz, Joseph. “Markets, Market Failures, and Development”. The American Economic
Review. 79.2 (May, 1989): 197-203.
Smith, Eric, Duncan K. Foley. “Classical thermodynamics and economic general
equilibrium theory” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control , 32.1 (Jan
2008): 7-65.
Taylor, Stephen J. Modeling Financial Time Series (2nd Edition) Singapore: World
Scientific Publishing Co. (2008)
Wagner, Stephan M, C. Bode, P. Koziol. “Supplier default dependencies: empirical
evidence from the automotive industry” European Journal of Operational
Research, 199.1 (2009): 150-161.
Weil, Laurent, Yves Kuhry. “Financial intermediation and macroeconomic efficiency”
Applied Financial Economics, 20.15 (2010): 1185-1193
Varian, Hal Microeconomic Analysis New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. (1992)
Zhang, Wei-Bin. Differential equations, bifurcations, and chaos in economics
Hackensack, NJ : World Scientific, 2005.
70

71

